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ABSTRACT
Purpose: The legitimacy of CEO pay in large U.S. firms has been repeatedly challenged in first 
decade of the 21st century.  However, increases in CEO pay have continued to outpace 
corresponding changes in firm size and performance.  This paper studies how large U.S. firms 
employ remuneration logics to legitimise CEO pay.  
Design/methodology/approach: Content analysis is used to identify 13 remuneration logics used in 
the 1998 and 2007 proxy statements from the largest 50 U.S. firms as well as 18 codes of practice 
issued between 1994 and 2007.
Findings: The remuneration policies of U.S. firms have become increasingly homogenous over 
time.  In 2007, all firms studied used the human resources, market and pay-for-performance logics 
to justify CEO pay. While firms use the remuneration logics to strategically manage their 
legitimacy, coercive and normative pressures are driving firms towards uniformity in their
remuneration policies. 
Originality/value: Legitimacy and institutional theory are used to understand and explain 
organisational discourse on executive remuneration.
Keywords: Corporate governance; Executive Remuneration; Legitimacy Theory; Institutional 
Theory
Paper type: Research paper
1. INTRODUCTION
Pay-for-performance is a rationalised myth.  It is the mantra of boards of directors, compensation 
consultants, professional associations, fund managers, regulations and the media (Jensen and 
Murphy, 2009; Tricker, 2009).  A board of directors will use fixed pay when it trusts that the CEO 
is conscientious and diligent, whereas they will use variable pay when it cannot trust the CEO to 
perform without explicit incentives.  The underlying assumption of pay-for-performance is that the 
CEO is opportunistic and incentives are necessary to focus his/her effort on the firm’s strategy and 
align his/her interests with those of the shareholders.  However, corporate scandals at Enron, 
WorldCom and, recently, US investment and insurance firms demonstrate that pay-for-performance 
as a means of minimising agent costs is not particularly effective.  Researchers have shown that 
there is nil-to-minimal link between CEO pay and corporate performance (Jensen and Murphy, 
1990; Murphy, 1999; Devers et al., 2007). To explain this weak relationship, some argue that CEOs 
are too powerful and are able to set their own pay (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004), whereas others argue 
that financial markets have pressured CEOs to meet quarterly earnings targets which encourages 
myopic behaviour (Jensen and Murphy, 2009).  
Discourse represents knowledge and power. The board of directors uses their annual general 
meetings, proxy statements and press releases to not only announce how and how much the CEO is 
remunerated, but also to justify these decisions.  The public has accepted that pay-for-performance 
is rational; it has become taken-for-granted.  The board of directors’ uses remuneration logics such 
as pay-for-performance (Wade et al., 1997), agency and human resources (Zajac and Westphal, 
1995) to rationalise their decision-making and legitimise it in the eyes of the public.  For example, 
Westphal and Zajac (1998) found that the financial markets reacted positively when companies 
announced the adoption of long-term incentive plans, particularly when they used the agency logic.  
They also found that this positive reaction persisted despite the companies not actually 
implementing the long-term incentive plans. Remuneration logics as systems of reasoning transmit 
knowledge.  For example, the agency logic states that share option plans can align the interests of 
the CEO with those of shareholders.  Remuneration logics as systems of persuasion can be used to 
change the way someone thinks.  For example, Westphal and Zajac (1998) found that the agency 
logic is powerful rhetoric is able to influence the share price of companies.
Organisations can manage their legitimacy through a strategic or institutional approach (Suchman, 
1995).  The remuneration logics can be employed strategically to influence the public and, perhaps, 
even alter the social contract between the organisation and society.  Institutions such as regulators 
and professional associations can use the remuneration logics to pressure organisations to change 
their practices.  In response, organisations can attempt to influence these institutions or decouple 
their public discourse from their private practices in an attempt to symbolically conform to these 
pressures.  For example, Zajac and Westphal (1995) found that while the human resources logic has 
been de-institutionalised as the agency logic has been institutionalised, U.S. firms use these 
remuneration logics both substantively and symbolically to justify CEO pay.  There are many 
remuneration logics and the empirical evidence implies that some of these have become
institutionalised discourse (Zajac and Westphal, 2004; Point and Tyson, 2006).  However, while 
researchers have identified a number of remuneration logics, they have not attempted to 
systematically identify all of the remuneration logics.  Aside from Zajac and Westphal’s (1995) 
study of the agency and human resources logics, researchers have also not examined which of the 
remuneration logics have become institutionalised or otherwise. 
This paper investigates how U.S. listed companies have changed their usage of the remuneration 
logics over time.  In the early 2000s, the Internet bubble burst and followed by many corporate 
scandals such as Enron and WorldCom.  There has been a proliferation of codes of practice on 
corporate governance since these corporate scandals (Enrione et al. 2006; Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009).  However, researchers have not studied whether these codes of practice contain 
remuneration logics. Nor have they studied whether the use of remuneration logics in codes of 
practice will produce coercive and normative pressures that can influence the use of remuneration 
logics in companies’ proxy statements. Institutional theory implies that codes of practice will 
influence companies (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Greenwood et al., 2002).  Therefore, this paper 
also investigates the U.S. codes of practice and their influence on companies’ proxy statements.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: First, the literature on discourse, institutions and 
legitimacy relating to executive compensation is reviewed; Second, the research questions and 
method are described; Third, the findings are presented; Fourth, the implications of findings for 
legitimacy and institutional theories is discussed; Finally, conclusions and future research 
opportunities are drawn.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Traditionally, executive compensation was typically comprised of two components – salary and 
bonuses – which are linked to performance measures (Jensen and Murphy, 2009). The link between 
pay and performance is critical to motivating and rewarding executives. Performance based 
measures can be set and be linked to pay in order to provide an incentive for executives to work 
harder, thereby rewarding pay based on performance. The major corporate scandals between 2001-
2003 highlighted weak corporate governing within companies and this issue was brought to the 
attention of the public. Today, corporate governance is an important issue for organisations around 
the world. Due to corporate scandals that have hit the US, regulators have adopted new practices 
through codes of governance. This discourse on executive compensation is important as it shapes 
society’s expectations about executive compensation. Society will be influence by articles and press 
releases issued by media, professional associations and academics, thus creating an opinion on 
topics relating to executive remuneration. The post-Enron effect has seen numerous associations 
issuing regulations and codes of best practices. Point and Tyson (2006) suggests that this can be 
explained from an institutional theory perspective in the form of coercive, normative and mimetic 
pressures. These pressures then have an impact on the organisation, thus making them become more 
similar to each other (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Institutional theory states that if an organisation 
does not conform to these pressures, it will lose legitimacy with stakeholders. 
2.1. Remuneration Logics
Remuneration logics are systems of reasoning which organisational and their actors use to explain 
or justify remuneration practices to themselves and others. These remuneration logics are used by 
firms and can be found through mediums such as proxy statements filed with the SEC. 
Remuneration logics can also be found in codes of best practice. There are many remuneration 
logics and examples can be found in literature (see table 1). For example, the agency logic is used 
as a justification to provide alignment between executive and shareholder’s interest (Point and 
Tyson, 2006); whereas the pay for performance logic states that an executive remuneration should 
be linked to firm performance (Wade et al, 1997). Another justification is the use of compensation 
consultants which uses “external validation justifications” to legitimise a firm’s compensation 
practices (Wade et al, 1997, p.4). Companies use remuneration logics to provide an explanation to 
convince shareholders and investors about their compensation practices and consequently this 
affects their legitimacy. Legitimacy theory implies that remuneration logics are used to explain or 
justify compensation practices to stakeholders.  Corporate governance codes of best practices are 
issued by associations and are intended to provide a guide as to what best practices are regarding 
executive compensation. This is intended to influence companies and support the legitimacy of 
regulators.
Remuneration 
Logics
Explanations of CEO 
Pay
Empirical Evidence
Agency Derived from agency theory, the agency logic 
The agency logic has been institutionalised in the 
U.S. and is often presented as a solution to poor 
describes how the CEO’s 
interests can be aligned 
with those of shareholders.
performance (Zajac and Westphal, 1995) as well as 
when large bonuses are awarded (Wade et al. (1997). 
Use of the agency logic has contributed to increasing 
executive compensation (St-Onge et al., 2001). 
Consultant
Compensation consultants 
are used to legitimise the 
CEO’s pay and 
compensation practices.
Compensation consultants are used to validate 
executive compensation, particularly when a 
company faces shareholder activism (Wade et al., 
1997).
Experience
Derived from human 
capital theory, the 
experience logic argues 
that the CEO’s pay should 
reflect his/her experience 
(or skills).
St-Onge et al. (2001) found that share option plans 
encourage executives to invest in their capabilities; 
they believed that their experience increases so does 
their (potential) rewards.
Human 
Resources
Derived from resource 
dependency theory, the 
human resources logic 
describes how the CEO is 
a scarce resource and how 
organisations can use 
compensation to attract 
and retain scarce 
managerial talent.
Human resources logic has been de-institutionalised 
(replaced by the agency logic), but is often presented 
as a rationale for introducing long-term incentive 
plans when performance is good (Zajac and 
Westphal, 1995).  Similarly, executives use the 
human resources logics to rationalise the adoption 
share option plans (St-Onge et al., 2001). Contrary to 
Zajac and Westphal (1995), Point and Tyson (2006) 
found that the human resources logic has become 
taken-for-granted (or a cliché) in the U.K.
Market
Derived from economics, 
the market logic argues 
the CEO’s pay will 
depend on the market 
forces of supply and 
demand.
Executives believe that for an executive 
compensation scheme to be competitive, it must 
include a share option plan (St-Onge et al., 2001).  
Essentially, executives believe that market forces 
determine how they are remunerated (St-Onge et al., 
2001). 
Motivation 
Derived from expectancy 
theory, the motivation 
logic describes that pay 
can be used increase the 
CEO’s effort/performance.
St-Onge et al. (2001) found that executives perceived 
share option plans as an important motivational tool 
as being awarded share options increases the 
executives’ wealth and status.
Pay-for-
Performance
The pay-for-performance 
logic argues that to avoid 
managerial shirking, the 
CEO’s pay should be 
linked to the firm’s 
(financial) performance.
Wade et al. (1997) found that US firms use the pay-
for-performance logic to justify the CEO’s pay, 
particularly when accounting performance is high or 
share price volatility is low. Point and Tyson (2006) 
found European firms use the pay-for-performance 
logic to rationalise their equity-based compensation 
schemes.
Responsibility
Derived from the 
managerial discretion 
hypotheses, the 
responsibility logic states 
that executive pay rises 
with their level of 
responsibility.
Executives believe that share options plans are most 
effective in situations where executives have high 
managerial discretion and are entrepreneurial (St-
Onge et al., 2001).  The level of responsibility 
reflects the share option grants which executives 
receive (St-Onge et al., 2001).
Table 1: Remuneration Logics in the Literature
Remuneration logics are used by companies to provide explanations of CEO pay in an attempt to 
influence the opinion of the public. While there are a wide variety of remuneration logics used by 
companies in the proxy statements, the most common and recurring ones were identified and 
included in the research. Point and Tyson (2006) undertook a study which found that the use of 
some logics have been used so often that it has become a cliché as seen in the UK.  The table above 
shows that these remuneration logics are actually derived from literature (St-Onge et al 2001) and 
are consistent with a number of assumptions and theories. For example, an assumption of agency 
theory states that individuals are self interested; therefore, incentives should be put in place to re-
focus those interests and align them with those of the shareholders. Another example is the 
motivation logic which is based on the assumption that money or greed is a factor which provides 
an incentive for individuals to maximise their effort. This factor ascertains how much an individual 
will exert their effort based on rewards. Remuneration logics will have an influence on practitioners 
such as companies and associations. Companies might alter their practices to match the ones in the 
literature or vice versa. This could be explained by legitimacy theory where organisations, as part of 
their strategy or conforming to institutional pressures are using logics in an attempt to justify 
executive compensation practices. 
2.2. Legitimacy Theory 
Suchman (1995, pg. 574) adopted a broad definition of legitimacy, defining it as “a generalised 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.” This particular 
definition of legitimacy asserts that a social contract exists between the entity and society.
Maintaining legitimacy is an issue organisations are faced with constantly. Organisations need to 
provide assurances to society about their ongoing performance through “warm signals” such as 
speeches or long term contracts (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). This contributes to maintaining a 
social contract with society. Part of maintaining legitimacy is also to prevent or overcome 
challenges to legitimacy. A crisis management plan should be established and ready to be used 
should a crisis occurs. Past accomplishments gained from legitimacy also need to be protected and 
built upon (Suchman, 1995). Ultimately, no entity is able to completely satisfy society’s 
expectations but maintaining legitimacy is about communicating with audiences and letting them 
know what is happening. There are several problems associated with legitimacy. Ashforth and 
Gibbs (1990) termed it the “double edge of legitimation” and suggested that a low level of 
legitimacy should not be seen as a lack of legitimacy but rather a challenge that needs to be dealt 
with. When legitimacy is problematic, the entity faces criticism by society which may lead to less 
capacity of resources to defend legitimacy (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). In this case, the organisation 
should attempt to repair its legitimacy by re-building up its credibility with its audience. 
A good example of a legitimacy problem in the US is to do with executive compensation in recent 
times. CEO salaries in US have reached high levels, creating legitimacy problems with the public, 
some of which whom believe that CEOs, through their hard work deserve high salaries while others 
believe that CEOs don’t work hard and therefore don’t deserve high salaries (Wade et al, 1997). 
According to Greenwood et al (2002), the role of professional associations affects an organisation’s 
legitimacy, through use of discourses which influences an organisation’s practices. Codes of 
corporate governance issued are also intended to support the legitimacy of regulators. To further 
promote legitimacy, companies have also used remuneration logics to justify executive 
remuneration practices. Remuneration logics are used to convince the public regarding a company’s 
compensation practices. Moreover, companies try to manage legitimacy and institutional pressures 
by having a representative from their organisation in associations which issue regulations or best 
practices. A good example is The Business Roundtable which is comprised of CEOs. 
If organisations do not conform to institutional pressures, it might affect their legitimacy with 
society. For example, in order to promote their legitimacy, an organisation may succumb to mimetic 
pressures to justify their actions. In the last decade, CEO compensation has become the centre of 
debate. Zajac and Westphal (1995) argued that while generally debates relating to CEO 
compensation are dominated by political and economic perspectives, there are symbolic and 
substantive considerations as well. Symbolic perspective is concerned with how firms portray their 
CEO compensation decisions while acting differently whereas substantive is concerned with
practices that an organisation actually set out to do. For example, the remuneration policy disclosed 
is not implemented or practiced in the Boardroom is considered to be symbolic as it does not reflect 
reality. Remuneration logics are considered to be symbolic when companies simply state the logic 
with no explanation whereas substantive use of remuneration logics in company proxies can be 
found when companies justify or provide reasons as to why they are using the logic in order to 
justify compensation practices. Moreover, Zajac and Westphal (1994) suggested there is a 
separation of substance and symbolism in CEO compensation contracts. The evidence that LTIP 
aligns interest of management to shareholders and is adopted by many firms but is used limitedly, 
suggests this is the case. 
2.3. Institutional Theory
In order to increase an organisation’s chances of survival, conformity is important (Oliver, 1991), as 
non conformity can lead to increased cost, for example, by reducing legitimacy (Phillips et al, 
2004). There are different approaches to institutional logics. Thornton and Ocasio (1999, 2008) 
argues that there are three necessary and complementary dimensions of institutions – structural, 
normative and symbolic whereas Scott (2008) unifies the different approaches arguing that there are 
three pillars of institutions – regulative (coercive; structural), normative and cultural-cognitive 
(mimetic; symbolic). However, despite their different approaches, research on institutional logics 
centers around understanding individual and organisational behaviours (Thornton and Ocasio, 
2008). Oliver (1991) argues that the main criticisms of institutional theory are assumptions of 
organisational passivity and its failure to address strategic behaviour. Having a passive 
organisational culture means that the organisation is unable to act on or get support to enable 
adaptations. However, Scott (2008) contradicts this argument. Instead, Scott argues that modern 
organisations are active players as even though they are affected by their environments, they are 
“also capable of responding to these influence attempts creatively and strategically.” Oliver (1991) 
also argues that conformity leads to inefficiency within the organisation but at the same time 
contributes to effectiveness in the organisation due to increased resources in the organisation. 
Furthermore, Oliver (1991) argues that measures that are used to evaluate performance may become 
influenced as strategies may be manipulated in order to shape organisational effectiveness. 
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), there are three processes through which organisational 
change occurs. Coercive isomorphism occurs through political influence in an attempt to further 
promote legitimacy. This could be in the form of laws or regulations passed by the government to 
encourage organisations to conform to certain requirements, for example, the SEC rules on 
executive compensation. Mimetic isomorphism, as the name suggests, is where an organisation 
copies or imitates another organisation’s actions. This can be justified as a response to an 
uncertainty on how to react to pressures faced by an organisation. Normative isomorphism is said to 
stem from external sources such as professionalism. There are two aspects to professionalism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The first is formal education such as tertiary education while the
second is the growth of professional networks around the world. These two aspects of 
professionalism provide a stage for an interchange of ideas between professionals which may in 
turn form new organisational behaviour, thereby overriding traditional ones. This then provides a 
catalyst for change within the organisation.
Greenwood et al (2002) argued that around the world, codes of governance are being 
institutionalised in response to corporate scandals, through 6 stages. The first is precipitating jolts 
which can occur as a result of social, technological or regulatory change. The second is 
deinstitutionalization which occurs when there is an emergence of new players leading to change. 
Thirdly, the preinstitutionalization occurs as a result of independent innovation and coming up with 
new ideas. The next stage is called theorization where organisations identify weaknesses and tries to 
come up with a solution. The diffusion stage then occurs when innovations become “objectified.” 
The last stage of reinstitutionalization occurs when the new practice is seen as manageable. 
A consequence of normative pressure can be said to be the result of excessive compensation of 
CEO salaries in recent years (Point and Tyson, 2006). Part of institutional theory is about how 
organisations and their discourse are shaped. According to Phillips et al (2004), organisations and 
their discourse are influence by the production of texts, which are prompted by actions. A good 
example of this is the use of remuneration logics issued by associations which influences an 
organisation’s practices. Influence can be in the form of change in perception or reaffirming 
practices already being carried out (Phillips et al, 2004). Organisations may also become subject to 
mimetic pressure and consequently may use the same remuneration logics in an attempt to catch up 
with a leader-follower company. However, not all texts will have an impact on the organisation. 
Phillips et al (2004) argued that only texts which are “embedded in discourse,” will be able to 
influence the organisation by shaping the environment in which the organisation is in. Moreover, 
the content of texts, origin and how they are interpreted must also be taken into account. For 
example, laws issued by regulators are mandatory, forcing organisations to comply with them while 
corporate governance codes of best practices are voluntary. That being said, there are still pressures 
to comply with society’s expectations. 
2.4. Theoretical Framework
Suchman (1995) argued that organisations use remuneration logics to promote legitimacy based on
two main reasons – strategic and institutional. The strategic view adopts a managerial perspective 
whereby an organisation might use remuneration logics as part of their strategy in order to 
legitimise their practices with society’s expectations. Examples of strategic use relating to 
remuneration logics could be the company’s public discourse on executive remuneration and their 
private executive remuneration policies and practices. Institutional theory asserts that organisations 
use remuneration logics to legitimise their practices in order to conform to society’s pressures. 
Institutional pressures come in three forms - coercive, normative and mimetic. Coercive pressure 
stems from regulations and laws put in place by government. Normative pressures are shaped by 
codes issued by associations and institutions. Mimetic pressures form the basis for benchmarking 
where organisations adapt to follow successful companies to improve their practices. An 
organisation might also select a target audience whom they think may support their current practices 
(Suchman, 1995). Organisations might also try to manipulate these institutional pressures as part of 
their strategy. For example, representatives from companies may be involved in the government and 
consequently may influence laws or regulations enacted. Similarly, representatives from companies 
may be involved in business or professional associations and therefore have a level of influence 
over codes issued. 
Figure 1: Remuneration Logics as a Means of Sustaining Organisational Legitimacy
Both legitimacy and institutional theory form the basis as to why organisations use remuneration 
logics to justify executive remuneration practices. Companies are subject to the three institutional 
pressures. A company may succumb to coercive pressure by complying with regulations or laws. 
This may be done symbolically or substantively. In order to defend their legitimacy, an organisation 
may mimic a leader-follower’s actions and use it as a benchmark to improve their practices. 
Normative pressure occurs when academic research is carried out and organisations feel compelled 
to justify their practices based on theory. Also, in order to manage their legitimacy and institutional 
pressures, an organisation may de-couple its public discourse on executive remuneration with 
private practices and policies. For example, what companies may be writing in public reports or 
filings relating to executive remuneration practices may not actually reflect the reality of their 
practice and policies. In other words, companies may be symbolically portraying their practices. 
However, in time, this might change substantively as an organisation attempts to change or improve 
its practices over time. This suggests that there is pressure on the organisation to conform to 
society’s expectations. 
3. RESEARCH METHOD
This paper builds on and extends Crombie (2009), who studied the remuneration logics used by 
regulators, professional associations and companies in the U.K., Australia and New Zealand. 
Drawing on legitimacy institutional theories, this paper examines the organizational discourse on 
executive remuneration in a U.S. context. The remuneration logics used in codes of practice and 
proxy statement are identified and then analysed.  An interpretive methodology is adopted and 
content analysis is employed to code the remuneration logics. 
3.1. Research Questions
The objective of this paper is to describe the prevalence of remuneration logics within the 
organisational discourse on executive remuneration, examine the extent to which the remuneration 
logics have become institutionalised discourse, and shed light on how the remuneration logics have 
become institutionalised discourse. While researchers have studied several remuneration logics and 
their antecedents and effects of organisational practices (Zajac and Westphal, 1995; Wade et al., 
1997), they have not studied the relationship between codes of practice and proxy statements.  In 
studying institutional pressure and remuneration logics, this paper contributes to legitimacy and 
institutional theories.  The research questions and method is described below (see table 2).
Research Questions Rationale Research Method
1. What remuneration logics 
are used?
Researchers have not identified 
all of the remuneration logics 
which organisations use.
Literature review and close 
reading of several 
organisational texts.
2. How much are the 
remuneration logics used in 
companies’ proxy 
statements in 1998 and 
2007?
To determine whether U.S. 
companies changed their usage 
of remuneration logics in order 
to defend against public 
criticism of CEO pay in the 
early-to-mid 2000s.
Content analysis of the proxy 
statements of the largest 50 
U.S. companies listed on the 
S&P500 index in 1998 and 
2007.
3. How, if at all, does industry 
type, firm size or firm 
performance influence 
companies’ usage of the 
remuneration logics?
Companies with greater public 
visibility (due to industry, size 
or performance) will need to 
defend their CEO pay more 
actively than other companies.
Correlation analysis of firm-
specific variables and the usage 
of remuneration logics in 1998 
and 2007.
4. How much are the 
remuneration logics used in 
regulations and codes of 
practice between 1992 and 
2007?
To determine whether U.S. 
public policy institutions (e.g. 
regulators and professional 
associations) changed their 
usage of remuneration logics in 
response to public criticism of 
CEO pay in the early-to-mid 
2000s.
Content analysis of 17 codes of 
practice issued between 1992 
and 2007.
5. How, if at all, have 
regulations and codes of 
practice influenced 
companies’ usage of the 
remuneration logics?
To determine whether coercive 
(e.g. regulation) and normative 
(e.g. professional associations) 
pressures have penetrated and 
constructed companies’ 
discourse on CEO pay.
Statistical analysis of the usage 
of remuneration logics in codes 
of practice and proxy 
statements.
6. Why have U.S. 
organisations changed their 
usage of the remuneration 
logics?
To explain the merits of the
strategic and institutional 
explanations of organisational 
legitimacy.
Interpretive analysis of the 
evidence produced from the 
above analyses.
Table 2: Research Questions and Method
3.2. Content Analysis
Content analysis was used to detect the presence or absence of these remuneration logics in the 
codes of practice and proxy statement.  Each of the remuneration logics were coded 1 (present) or 0 
(absent) for each of the texts included in the sample.  A coding instructions document was produced 
to ensure that the content analysis was reliable and repeatable (see table 5). The remuneration logics 
consist of strings of words. The content analysis objectives and quantifies these phrases.  The 
coding process is inherently subjective and interpretive, but can appear to be concrete and exact.
3.3. Pilot Study
As one of the researchers had previous experience with coding texts, the first stage in the pilot study 
involved the two new researchers coding 20 sample texts and comparing them with the first 
researcher. The coding was done using the list of remuneration logics that had been developed in
Crombie (2009). Differences were examined to reach consensus. The second stage involved 
examining Annual Reports, 10-Ks and proxy statements to see which documents contained 
information regarding CEO remuneration in a U.S. setting. Since proxy statements were found to 
contain the relevant information, they were examined to see what remuneration logics were being 
used by the US companies. The examination resulted in the addition of three more logics to the 
existing list of logics. The two researchers then coded the proxy statements of six companies 
randomly selected from the sample list and five regulations to test agreement between the 
researchers. There was high degree of agreement between the two researchers and any differences 
were discussed and agreements reached. 
3.4. Sample
The sample included codes of practice and proxy statements. Codes of practice on corporate 
governance in the US were identified through textbooks, journal articles and websites. These were 
then obtained through the internet, where electronic copies of the regulations were downloaded to 
enable electronic searching of the texts. Where electronic copies were not available, hard copies of 
codes of practice such as the Corporate Director’s Guidebook issued by the American Bar 
Association were obtained through the University of Canterbury library. Initially, 73 codes of 
practice were obtained. Texts which were irrelevant (e.g. the Gramm Leach Bliley Act) or did not 
relate to executive remuneration (e.g. Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway 
Committee) were removed from the sample. Further, codes of practice issued after 2007 were also 
not included. Only 18 codes were included in the sample between the years 1992 and 2007. 
The sample of companies whose proxy statements were examined comprised of the top 50 
companies by market capitalization listed on Standard and Poor’s (S&P) index as at 31 December 
1998 and 2007. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that a company whose 
securities are registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 file a proxy 
statement prior to a shareholder meeting (http://www.sec.gov/answers/proxy.htm) which must 
contain information regarding executive compensation.  While this is required of all US companies, 
the largest companies were chosen because their policies and practices are more heavily scrutinized 
than smaller companies. The list of the top 50 S&P companies were obtained from the database 
Datastream. 36 of the companies were on both the 1998 and 2007 Top50 lists. The lists were very 
similar with only 14 companies that were different in each list1 . The proxy statements of all 
companies on the top50 lists were downloaded from either the company website or from the SECs 
website. 
3.5. Independent Variables
This study is concerned with discerning what logics are used by companies and in regulations and 
what factors may be influencing there usage. Financial performance and firm size may have an 
effect on which logics are used and the extent of their usage as large companies may feel the need 
to more strongly justify their CEO pay due to their visibility. A change in performance, especially if 
a company performs poorly when compared to the previous year, may also prompt companies to 
use more logics to rationalize their executive pay. To check for such effects, financial statistics such 
as market value, sales revenue, no. of employees, return on assets, return on equity, price-to-
earnings, and earnings per share statistics were collected (see table 3). 
Variable 19982 2007 Change (1997-
1998)3
Change (2006-
2007)
                                                
1 To allow for comparison of an identical list of companies, the 1998 documents of all the 
companies on the 2007 Top50 list was collected. If a company on the 2007 list was formed through 
a merger, the 1998 documents of the original companies were collected. Subsequent analysis 
revealed little or no difference in the findings between the two different lists and the continuous list.
2 In the 1998 and 2007 columns, the first number is the mean and the second (bracketed) number is 
the standard deviation. 
Financial (US$ 
millions)
Market Value $92,708.62($70,971.43)
$130,776.53
($89,645.39)
+30.27
(+0.048%)
+7.15
(+0.005%)
Sales Revenue $34,697.43(44,603.50)
$72,679.66
($76,264.66)
+5,199.99
(+0.018%)
+6,929.98
(+0.011%)
Net Income $3,410.51($4,278.83)
$7,542.51
($6,726.54)
+818.04
(+0.032%)
+94.62
(+0.001%))
Total Assets $87,573.97($146,743.10)
$271,398.73
($482,474.95)
+14,738.51
(+0.020%)
+40,676.53
(+0.018%)
Shareholder’s 
Equity
$14,660.02
($16,688.71)
$41,947.74
($36,406.12)
+2,981.94
(+0.026%)
+3,783.50
(+0.010%))
Number
Employees 110,681.50
(130,123.60)
153,177.66
(271,403.82)
+11,099.24
(+10.92%)
+10,804.40
(+7.588%)
Financial (US$)
Earnings per 
share
1.72
(1.89)
2.58
(2.72)
-0.0046
(-0.26%)
-2.3254
(-47.417%)
Ratios
Price-to-Earnings 51.28(72.08)
21.35
(11.65)
+22.46
(+77.57%)
-2.33
(-9.56%)
Return on Asset 0.091%(0.065%)
0.089%
(0.060%)
+0.0088
(+10.60%)
+0.0022
(+2.529%)
Return on Equity 25.42%(16.37%)
22.08%
(11.16%)
+8.9422
(+54.24%)
+0.2512
(+1.15%)
Table 3: Firm Size and Performance of Top50 Companies
The industry in which a company operates may also affect its disclosure practices as companies in 
certain industries are more scrutinized due to the nature of the industry, such as companies that have 
significant environmental effects. To check for industry effect, companies were classified according 
to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) and checked for any correlation between industry 
and average use of logics (see table 4). The results of the correlation tests are provided in the 
findings. In both years, most companies were in the Financials and Technology sectors. The lowest 
number of companies was in the Basic Material and Utilities industry with one company from the 
Basic Material industry in 1998 and one from the Utilities industry in 2007. 
Industry 1998 2007
Oil and Gas 2 5
Basic Materials 1 0
Industrials 2 4
Consumer Goods 6 5
Health Care 7 8
Consumer Services 8 5
Telecommunications 3 2
Utilities 0 1
Financials 9 10
Technology 12 10
Total 50 50
                                                                                                                                                                
3 In the change columns, the first number is the absolute change between years and the second 
(bracketed) number is the percentage change between years.
Table 4: Distribution of Top50 Companies across Industries
3.6. Dependent Variables
Since the study builds on the study conducted by Crombie (2009), the remuneration logics 
examined in the previous study were used. An examination of the proxy statements of three 
randomly selected companies from each of the Top50 lists and 5 regulation documents revealed 
three additional logics (Experience, Performance Measurement and Responsibilities) that were also 
included in the list of remuneration logics. In total, the study examined the use of thirteen logics. 
The logics are explained in the table below, along with the keywords that were used to search for 
them.
Remuneration 
Logics
Definition and Keywords Example4
Achievement
Definition: The CEO’s remuneration 
should be based on the achievement of 
financial objectives.
Keywords: (1) Achieve; (2) Corporate 
or Financial; and (3) Goal or Objective.
“…compensation… for executive 
officers includes… annual cash bonus, 
which is based on the achievement of 
Company financial and individual 
goals.” (Time Warner, 2007, p.42)
Agency
Definition: The remuneration practices 
should align the interests of the CEO 
with those of the shareholders.
Keywords: (1) Align; and (2) Interests.
“Stock options are granted by the 
Company… to align the interests of 
employees with those of the 
stockholders.” (Intel, 1998, p.19)
Appropriate
Definition: The CEO’s remuneration or 
remuneration practices should be 
appropriate.
Keyword: Appropriate.
“In the opinion of the Committee, 
Exxon has an appropriate and 
competitive compensation program.” 
(ExxonMobil, 1998, p.37)
Consultant
Definition: Independent advisors should 
assist in formulating executive 
remuneration policy or practices.
Keywords: (1) Independent or External; 
and (2) Consultants or Advisors.
“All amounts were determined by the 
Committee, assisted by its independent 
compensation consultant” (3M, 2007, 
p.45)
Contribution
Definition: The remuneration practices 
are designed to reward the CEO’s 
contribution to corporate performance.
Keywords: (1) Contribution, Influence, 
Effort, Merit, Impact or Delivery; and 
(2) Corporate performance (or similar).
“The… philosophy [is] to provide…
rewards based… on the individual’s
contribution to the Company” (Gap 
Inc, 1998, p.15)
Experience
Defintion: The CEO’s remuneration is 
dependent on his/her experience.
Keyword: Experience.
“The objective of base salary is to 
provide fixed compensation… that 
reflects his or her job… experience…” 
(Walt Disney, 2007, p.19)
Fairness
Definition: The CEO’s remuneration or 
remuneration practices should be fair.
Keywords: Equitable, Fair, Reasonable, 
or Not Excessive.
“Exelon’s shareholders are best served 
when we can successfully recruit and 
retain talented executives with 
compensation that is competitive and 
fair.” (Exelon, 2007, p.33)
Human 
Resources
Definition: The remuneration practices 
should attract and retain a skilled CEO.  
Keywords: Attract, Retain, Select, 
Secure or Recruit.
“The objective of Motorola's executive 
compensation program is to attract and 
retain key executives” (Motorola, 
1998, p.13)
                                                
4 Keywords are bolded or emphasised in the examples from the proxy statements.
Market
Definition: The CEO’s remuneration 
should be competitive. 
Keywords: Competitive, Market, or 
Comparable.
“The core principles that underlie our 
approach to compensation are that NEO 
compensation should: be externally 
competitive…” (Chevron, 2007, p.49)
Motivation
Definition: The remuneration practices 
should motivate the CEO. 
Keywords: Motivate, Encourage or 
Incentivise.
“…we must motivate and reward them 
[executives] to build long-term 
stockholder value.” (Qualcomm, 2007, 
p.23)
Pay-for-
Performance
Definition: The CEO’s remuneration 
should be related to corporate 
performance.
Keywords: (1) At risk, Performance-
based (or -related), Variable; and (2) 
Compensation, Pay or Remuneration.
“We design our performance-based
compensation so that differences in 
performance will result in significant 
differences in the compensation our 
executives receive.” (McDonalds, 2007, 
p.24)
Performance 
Measurement
Definition: The CEO’s remuneration 
should be dependent balanced set of 
performance measures.
Keywords: (1) financial and non-
financial; or (2) qualitative and 
quantitative.
“the Management Development and 
Compensation Committee… evaluates 
a broad range of both quantitative and 
qualitative factors” (GE, 2007, p.19)
Responsibility
Definition: The CEO’s remuneration is 
dependent on his/her level of 
responsibility.
Keyword: Responsibility
“Base salaries for executives are 
initially determined by evaluating 
executives’ levels of responsibility” 
(Wallgreen, 1998, p.11)
Table 5: The Remuneration Logics
3.7. Coding Procedure
The coding of the documents was done by two researchers. It was thus necessary to ensure a high 
degree of consensus between the two individuals. A list of remuneration logics along with their 
definitions and keywords that should be looked for was used by both. In almost all the proxy 
statements, the remuneration logics regarding the CEO were disclosed under the Compensation 
Committee’s Report. In some cases, logics were also found in other places such as management’s 
comments regarding shareholder proposals, appendices etc. Careful consideration had to be given in 
deciding when the logic was being used to describe or support a practice/policy and whether or not 
it should be counted. It was also necessary to ascertain whether the logic referred to policies 
regarding the remuneration of the CEO or other such as directors other than the CEO. The coding 
procedure required recording the absence or presence of each logic on a coding sheet. The 
researchers also recorded the pages that the logics were found so that they could be compared in 
cases of inconsistencies between the coders and any confusions resolved. In cases where there were 
uncertainties whether or not to count a remuneration logic, the instance was discussed and joint 
decisions were reached. This was done to ensure inter-coder reliability.
3.8. Data Analysis
The data gathered in the study were stored and analyzed using Excel and SPSS. The averages of the 
dependent variables were calculated to observe trends in the usage of remuneration logics between 
the two years under study for company proxies and over the period for regulations. The differences 
in the average use of logics in 1998 and 2007 were checked for statistical significance. Correlation 
tests were also performed between the logics themselves as well as between logics and financial 
statistics and industry to check for significant relationships.
3.9. Limitations
The method used in this study has certain limitations. The sample chosen is small and is not 
random. Selecting the Top50 companies from the S&P 500 list has meant that only companies of a 
certain size were included in the sample. This may influence results. The proxy statements are also 
scrutinized only at two points in time. This makes it difficult to explain accurately any changes in 
the use of remuneration logics that are found. The coding was also done by two separate coders. 
Though precautions were taken to ensure inter-coder reliability, due to the subjectivity involved in 
the coding process, some differences may exist. Lastly, the study only examined thirteen logics due 
to time constraints. There may have been other logics that are used by companies but have not been 
studied in this research. 
4. FINDINGS
The findings indicate that companies consistently used more remuneration logics than regulations.  
The number of logics used in proxies has also increased over time with any correlations between 
financial statistics and logics used disappearing. With no apparent industry effects, it appears that 
remuneration logics used in company proxies are becoming homogenous, suggesting mimetic 
isomorphism. While the use of remuneration logics in both regulations and proxies have increased 
between 1998 and 2007, the usage has always been higher in company proxies. The average 
number of logics used in regulations between 1998 and 2007 is 5.38 and is lower than what was 
used in company proxies in either year (see table 6). The variation at 3.121 is also very high. There 
has also been no consistent pattern overall regarding the number of remuneration logics used in 
regulations (see figure 2).
Remuneration Logics 1998 Proxy 
Statements
2007 Proxy 
Statements
Codes of Practice
Mean 7.80 10.64 5.33
Standard Deviation 2.01 1.35 3.11
Minimum 4 8 1
Maximum 11 13 11
Number of texts 50 50 18
Table 6: Usage of the Remuneration Logics in Organisational Texts
Figure 2: Usage of the Remuneration Logics in Organisational Texts
4.1. Companies’ Proxy Statements
Information regarding the compensation of executives of a company was found to be highly 
structured. Proxy statements issued by a company are governed by the Securities Act of 1933 and 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and companies are required to include a section on executive 
compensation. The Executive Compensation sections in the two years under study, i.e. 1998 and 
2007,   were largely similar.  There were variations in section headings and some differences in the 
way the information was presented. In 1998, all the information was contained under the section 
‘Report of Executive Compensation Committee’ following the SEC requirement. The rules were 
changed by SEC in 2006 when companies were required to include a section ‘Compensation 
Discussion and Analysis’. Both these sections generally contained the principles or the philosophies 
on which the compensation policies of the company was based. The proxy statements did not refer 
to any regulations or codes of corporate governance with which they comply. This is similar to most 
European countries, except for the United Kingdom (Point and Tyson, 2006).
On an average, the number of logics used in proxy statements in both years was high (see table 6). 
While in 1998, the number logics used was spread out, by 2007 most companies were using 
between ten to twelve logics in their proxy statements (see table 7), implying that companies across 
all industries are consistently using more logics to justify executive remuneration. 
Number of Remuneration Logics 1998 2007
0 0 0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 2 0
5 5 0
6 7 0
7 10 0
8 7 5
9 7 5
10 6 10
11 6 15
12 0 13
13 0 2
Total 50 50
Table 7: Distribution of the Remuneration Logics in Companies’ Proxy Statements
Table 8 ranks the usage of each of the remuneration logics and gives the change in use of each of 
the logics from 1998 to 2007 in company proxy statements. Overall, the use of all the logics has 
increased, though some have increased far more than others. The largest increase has been in the 
usage of the Fairness logic (see 250%, inspite of which it remained the least used logic.  The 
Consultant logic had the next highest increase (96%), which made it the 5th highest used logic in 
2007 compared to 9th highest used in 1998. Though the use of the logics Achievement and 
Contribution has increased, their increase has been comparatively low resulting in their ranks falling 
from 4 and 7, respectively to 6 and 9. The ranking of the logics Appropriate, Experience, 
Performance and Fairness remained unchanged. The ranks of the other logics have either remained 
the same or have climbed only one rank.
Remuneration 
Logics
Rank – 1998 Rank – 2007 Average –
19985
Average –
2007
Change (1998 
– 2007)6
Pay-for-
Performance 1 1
1.00
(0.00)
1.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0%)
Human 
Resources 2 1
0.88
(0.39)
1.00
(0.00)
+0.12  
(+14%)
Market 2 1 0.88(0.33)
1.00
(0.00)
+0.12
(+14%)
Achievement 4 6 0.82(0.39)
0.92
(0.27)
+0.10
(+12%)
Motivation 5 4 0.72(0.454)
0.96
(0.20)
+0.24
(+33%)
Responsibility 6 6 0.70(0.46)
0.92
(0.27)
+0.22
(+31%)
Contribution 7 9 0.68(0.47)
0.82
(0.39)
+0.14
(+21%)
Agency 8 6 0.58(0.50)
0.92
(0.27)
+0.34
(+59%)
Consultant 9 5 0.48(0.51)
0.94
(0.24)
+0.46
(+96%)
Appropriate 10 10 0.38(0.49)
0.70
(0.46)
+0.32
(+84%)
Experience 11 11 0.36(0.49)
0.58
(0.50)
+0.22
(+61%)
Performance 
Measurement 12 12
0.30
(0.46)
0.46
(0.50)
+0.16
(+53%)
                                                
5 In the “Average – 1998” and “Average – 2007” columns, the first number is the mean and the 
second (bracketed) number is the standard deviation.
6 In the “Change (1998 – 2007)” column, the first number is the absolute change between years and 
the second (bracketed) number is the percentage change between years.
Fairness 13 13 0.12(0.33)
0.42
(0.50)
+0.30
(+250%)
Total 7.80(2.01)
10.64
(1.35)
+2.84
(+36%)
Table 8: Usage of the Remuneration Logics in Top50 Companies’ Proxy Statements
An industry-wise comparison of the average use of remuneration logics reveals that the highest user 
of logics in 1998 was the Oil and Gas industry (9.50) (see table 9). This changed in 2007 when the 
Technology industry became the highest user (11.50). A comparison of the changes in the average 
number of logics shows that the largest increase has been in the Consumer Goods industry 
(61.92%). The Oil and Gas industry had the lowest increase of only 7.37%. The use in two of the 
industries (Basic Materials and Utilities) is incomparable as there were no companies from that 
industry in either 1998 or 2007. A test of correlation between number of logics used and industries 
revealed no significant correlations in 1998 and only one statistically significant correlation in 2007. 
Companies in the Technology industry had a positive correlation with the number of logics used 
(0.321, p<0.05). The number of companies in the industry for the two years does not differ very 
much nor does the composition of the industry, with seven companies that were common in both 
years. 
Industry # of Firms –
1998
# of Firms –
2007
Average –
19987
Average –
2007
Change 
(1998 –
2007)8
Basic Materials 1 0 9.00(0.00)
--- ---
Consumer Goods 6 5 6.67(1.75)
10.80
(1.10)
+4.13
(+61.92%)
Consumer Services 8 5 6.75(2.32)
10.00
(1.58)
+3.25
(+48.15%)
Financials 9 10 8.22(1.86)
10.80
(0.79)
+2.58
(+31.39)
Healthcare 7 8 8.57(1.51)
10.25
(1.75)
+1.68
(+19.60%)
Industrials 2 4 8.00(4.24)
10.25
(1.26)
+2.25
(28.13%)
Oil and Gas 2 5 9.50(2.12)
10.20
(1.48)
+0.70
(+7.37%)
Technology 12 10 7.83(2.12)
11.50
(1.18)
+3.67
(+46.87%)
Telecommunications 3 2 8.00(1.00)
10.00
(2.82)
+2.00
(+25%)
Utilities 0 1 --- 11.00(0.00)
---
Total 7.80(2.01)
10.64
(1.35)
+2.84
(+36%)
Table 9: Distribution of Remuneration Logics across Industries
                                                
7 In the “Average – 1998” and “Average – 2007” columns, the first number is the mean and the 
second (bracketed) number is the standard deviation.
8 In the “Change (1998 – 2007)” column, the first number is the absolute change between years and 
the second (bracketed) number is the percentage change between years.
Testing correlations between the remuneration logics and the financial statistics yielded few 
significant relationships, none of which were present in both the years under study (table 10 and 
11). The changes in the financial statistics were calculated for both the years because they would 
give more significant findings. In 1998, significant negative relationships were found between the 
logics ‘reward achievement’ and market value (-0.359, p<0.05) and both the logics ‘reward 
achievement’ and ‘reward competitively’ were negatively correlated with ROE and ROA. The 
relationships between ‘reward competitively’ and the financial measures may be explained by the 
fact that if a company is performing poorly, they may justify the level of executive pay as being 
comparable to market prices for executive talent. The fact that the logic ‘reward achievement’ is 
negatively correlated with market value and the returns on assets and equities may signal a 
disassociation between the use of logics in policies and actual practice. Negative correlations were 
also found between ‘align interests’ and sales revenue. But the relationship is not very strong (-
0.288, p<0.05). 
None of the above significant relationships are found to exist in 2007. Some correlations could not 
be calculated because by 2007 they were being used by all companies (‘attract and retain’, ‘pay for 
performance’ and ‘reward competitively’). There were only four statistically significant 
relationships in 2007 but they appear to be random occurrences. Overall, there does not appear to be 
very strong relationships between the financial performance of a company and logics it uses to 
justify its executive compensation policies. The relationships that may have existed seem to 
dissipate as more and more companies use the same logics to explain pay.
Financials Human 
Resources
Agency 
Logic
Achievement 
Logic
Market 
Logic
Fairness
Market Value -0.359
(p<0.05)
Sales Revenue -0.288
(p<0.05)
Price-Earnings Ratio -0.348
(p<0.05)
-0.404
(p<0.01)
EPS -0.343
(p<0.05)
Return on Assets -0.424
(p<0.01)
-0.328
(p<0.05)
Return on Equity -0.381
(p<0.01)
-0.360
(p<0.05)
Share Price -0.282
(p<0.05)
No. of employees 0.347
(p<0.05)
-0.281
(p<0.05)
-0.348
(p<0.05)
Table 10: Correlations Remuneration Logics and Changes in Firm Size and Performance in 
1998
Financials Market Logic Achievement Responsibility Consultant
Net Income 0.502
(p<0.01)
Sales Revenue -0.404
(p<0.01)
0.365
(p<0.01)
Total Assets -0.301
(p<0.05)
Share Price 0.307
(p<0.05)
Table 11: Correlations Remuneration Logics and Changes in Firm Size and Performance in 
2007
4.2. Regulators’ and Professional Associations’ Codes of Practice
In the U.S., issuers of codes of practice have produced at least 18 regulations relating to executive 
remuneration between 1992 and 2007. In the sample, there were 3 codes that were produced before 
1998 and 15 codes produced from 1998-2007. This finding can be explained by the post-Enron 
effect where numerous regulations were produced following the high profile corporate scandals 
between 2001 and 2003. The regulations are issued by a wide range of organizations (see table 12)
and use varying number of logics. The executives’ association and the investors’ association had the 
most involvement (17%) followed by the stock exchange and professional associations (11%). This 
is consistent with the legitimacy theory where the issuers of these regulations comprise of 
representatives from companies and consequently seek to defend their legitimacy by issuing 
principles. With regards to the number of logics used in regulations used over the years, there does 
not appear to be a clear upwards trend. 
Year Codes of Practice(Issuer and Title)
Type of 
Issuer
Stated Motivation for 
Issuing
# of 
Rem. 
Logics
1992
American Law Institute 
Principles of Corporate 
Governance
Professional 
Association --- 1
1994 Corporate Director’s Guidebook – American Bar Association
Professional 
Association
Revised due to evolution and 
growth of corporate 
governance
5
1997 Business Roundtable Executives’ Association Update of past publication 3
1999 CalPERS Fund Manager --- 3
2002 The Conference Board Business Association
Address declining public and 
investor trust 7
2002 Business Roundtable Executives’ Association Due to changes in US 3
2002 Council of Institutional Investors Investors’ Association --- 2
2003 AFL-CIO Employees’ Association
Due to corporate scandals 
(e.g. Enrol and Worldcom) 
and regulatory reforms 
7
2003 NACD Blue Ribbon Report on Executive Compensation
Directors’ 
Association
Due to regulatory reforms and 
low public confidence in 
directors
5
2003 Breeden Report Government Due to WorldCom 8
2003 NYSE Final Corporate Governance Rules
Stock 
Exchange --- 2
2004 NYSE Amendments to corporate governance rules
Stock 
Exchange
Pressure from SEC and public 
perceptions of NYSE’s 
integrity
3
2006 SEC
Stock 
Exchange 
Regulator
To improve investors 
understanding of executive 
compensation
5
2007 CFA Institute Professional Association
To improve transparency of 
executive compensation due 8
to recent changes
2007 TIAA-CREF Fund Manager
Due to current developments 
in
corporate governance
11
2007 Aspen Institute
Non-
Government 
Organisation
To improve corporations’ 
executive compensation 
principles
3
2007 Business Roundtable Executive-Compensation-Principles
Executives’ 
Association
Due to changing perceptions 
of best practice of executive 
compensation
10
2007 Council of Institutional Investors Investors’ Association --- 10
Table 12: History of the Codes of Practice
When comparing the mean of individual remuneration logics used in codes pre-1998 and 2007, the 
use of many logics increased (see table 14) though statistically significant increases were in the use 
of the consultant logic (α<0.001), responsibility logic (α<0.05) and performance measurement logic 
(α<0.01). The use of the Market and Achievement logics decreased between the years. Between 
1994 and 2007, the pay-for-performance logic had the highest use in regulations, followed by the 
agency and consultant logics. The experience logic was still not used in any of the codes of practice 
by 2007. 
Remuneration Logics Pre-1998
(3 texts)9
1998-2007
(15 texts)
1994-2007
(18 texts)
Pay-for-Performance 0.33(0.58)
0.93
(0.26)
0.83
(0.383)
Human Resources 0.33(0.58)
0.53
(0.52)
0.50
(0.514)
Market 0.67(0.58)
0.47
(0.52)
0.50
(0.514)
Achievement 0.00(0.00)
0.20
(0.41)
0.17
(0.383)
Motivation 0.33(0.58)
0.33
(0.49)
0.33
(0.485)
Responsibility 0.00(0.00)
0.27
(0.46)
0.22
(0.428)
Contribution 0.00(0.00)
0.07
(0.26)
0.06
(0.236)
Agency 0.33(0.58)
0.80
(0.41)
0.72
(0.461)
Consultant 0.00(0.00)
0.73
(0.46)
0.61
(0.502)
Appropriate 0.67(0.58)
0.47
(0.52)
0.50
(0.514)
Experience 0.00(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
Performance 
Measurement
0.00
(0.00)
0.40
(0.51)
0.33
(0.485)
Fairness 0.33 0.60 0.56
                                                
9 The first number in each column is the mean and the second (bracketed) number is the standard 
deviation.
(0.58) (0.51) (0.511)
Total 3.00(2.00)
5.80
(3.121)
5.33
(3.106)
Table 13: Usage of the Remuneration Logics in the Codes of Practice
4.3. Preliminary Evidence of Institutional Isomorphism
The findings of high use of remuneration logics in proxy statements of 1998 prompted an 
investigation of even earlier statements. An examination of 1989 proxy statements of eight 
companies10 revealed that while there is little difference in the number of logics used between 1998 
and 2007, there was a substantial increase in the number of logics used in proxy statements between 
1989 and 1998 (see figure 3). This coincides with changes in SEC rules in 1992. The new rules 
required companies to disclosure more information regarding their compensation policies. The 
marked increase in the number of logics used between 1989 and 1998 would point towards 
companies using more logics to justify the executive pay which would now be open to closer 
scrutiny. 
Figure 3: Impact of the 1992 SEC Change in CEO Pay Disclosure Requirements
5. DISCUSSION 
This paper present scant evidence of U.S. companies attempting to strategically manage their 
organisational legitimacy.  The issuers of the codes of practice include associations of directors and 
executives.  This suggests that companies may attempt to alter the codes of practice which they 
choose to comply with.  Also, the prevalence of the remuneration logics differs in companies’ proxy 
statements and codes of practice.  For example, the fairness logic is important in codes of practice 
than in annual reports.  However, there is no direct evidence of symbolic or substantive 
management.  After reviewing 100 proxy statements, the researchers do believe that some 
                                                
10 A complete set of the top50 companies could not be examined due to difficulties in obtaining 
1989 proxy statements.
remuneration logics are substantiated more than others.  For example, the proxy statements contain 
lots of information on the achievement, agency, human resources, market and pay-for-performance 
logic. These logics are often explicitly linked to specific remuneration practices such as share 
option plans. But this is not empirical evidence.
The paper presents limited evidence of institutionalisation by coercive and normative pressures. The 
remuneration logics are used to a much lower extent in the codes of practice than in the proxy 
statements.  While the remuneration logics have become taken-for-granted, the process by which 
the remuneration logics were institutionalisation is still unknown.  Certainly, corporate scandals 
lead to the proliferation of codes of practice (Enrione et al., 2006), but it is unclear whether the use 
of the remuneration logics in these codes of practice have influenced proxy statements.  Perhaps, 
the producers of the codes of practice are drawing on so-called best practice from the proxy
statements.  Future research is needed to examine how the remuneration logics spread from one 
proxy statement to another.
6. CONCLUSION
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that U.S. companies have adopted a boilerplate 
approach to executive remuneration policy in their proxy statements.  Comparing proxy statements 
from 1998 to 2007, the use of all of the remuneration logics has increased significantly. Similarly, 
the remuneration logics have also been increasingly used in codes of practice. The remuneration 
logics have become institutionalised discourse; they are taken-for-granted way of justifying CEO 
pay.  While none of the remuneration logics studied decreased in prevalence, some remuneration 
logics have been used to a much lesser extent than others.  For example, the fairness logic was 
present the least in proxy statements in both 1998 and 2007.  Such a range of remuneration logics 
gives the board of directors a lot of flexibility; they can similar use different remuneration logics or 
emphasis some remuneration logics more than others to justify CEO pay under any performance 
conditions.  Crystal (1991) similarly warned that compensation consultants justify increasing CEO 
pay in when firm performance is good or poor by adjusting their rationale.  Thus, the remuneration 
logics may enable the board of directors to decouple CEO pay from corporate performance. 
The findings of this study are limited by the fact that only large companies are studied. While the 
SEC rules require all companies that are listed with it to give extensive disclosures in their proxy 
statements, large companies may be disclosing more than others. Smaller companies may not have 
similar resources or may not feel the same pressures to legitimize their practices if they are less 
visible. Any effect that size of a company may have had on the number and usage of the 
remuneration logics would not have been detected by this study. Further, the level of CEO pay may 
also affect the number and usage of logics. Future research should include CEO pay as independent 
variable to assess what affect it has the use of remuneration logics in proxy statements.  Qualitative 
assessments of the use of logics may give a better indication of whether the companies are using the 
logics symbolically or substantively. Also, assessing how frequently companies use the 
remuneration logic in their proxy statement will give an indication of the relative importance. 
Finally, extending the time period studied to pre-1992 proxy statements may provide more insight 
into how use of logics has changed due to the coercive pressure of the SEC.
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